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Abstract: This article is based on a case study of reindeer husbandry management in Norway. I argue that the inclusion 
of resource users in a co-management process may at times increase social tension and weaken the system of governance. 
The co-management experience indicates that the system works well in most areas. However, because of the differences 
in contextual circumstances, the system suffers from a legitimacy deficit with respect to how representatives are appoint-
ed and how interests are distributed among the various boards. The study argues that even if policies and institutions are 
adapted to local contexts, there may be a need for a stronger connection between the co-management boards and other 
institutions, such as the Sami Parliament and the Reindeer Husbandry Administration. Specifically, I argue that instead 
of increasing legitimacy through equal user-group representation in management decision making, the very structures 
of the system—in particular, nominations and appointments—may lead to unequal user-group representation and thus 
threaten the success of the management system.
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Introduction 
This article discusses user-group representation 
and co-management of natural resources. Co-
management is defined as “a collaborative and 
participatory process of regulatory decision-
making between representatives of user-groups, 
government agencies, research institutions and 
other stakeholders” (Jentoft, 2003:12). The es-
sential principle of co-management is that the 
people whose interests are affected by manage-
ment decisions should have a voice in those de-
cisions. Moreover, managing natural resources 
is a complicated task that calls for the involve-
ment of industry representatives because of 
their lifelong experience and understanding 
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of the issues involved1 (Jentoft & McCay, 
1995:228; Berkes, 1997:5; 2009:1692).
Reindeer husbandry co-management in Nor-
way forms a complex system in which authority 
is delegated to representatives at different man-
1 Reindeer husbandry is both an industry and a 
livelihood for the Sami pastoralists. Reindeer 
husbandry is not only a way of securing an in-
come but is also a long cultural tradition (Paine, 
1994). In this paper, the term “industry” will be 
used, but I will not exclude the social and cul-
tural aspects of reindeer husbandry. Because my 
paper focuses on the reindeer husbandry man-
agement system and because reindeer husbandry 
is managed as an industry, the term “industry” is 
used in this paper. 
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agement levels. The co-management system 
emanates from the Reindeer Husbandry Board 
at the national level, from six area boards at the 
regional level, from approximately 80 district 
boards at the local level and from approximate-
ly 100 siida boards at the local level (Lov av 15. 
juni 2007 nr. 40 om reindrift (reindriftsloven) 
[The Reindeer Husbandry Law], §43, §71 and 
§72). Despite their broad representation at 
all levels, several of the Sami pastoralists have 
claimed that their views have not been taken 
into consideration during decision making 
(Sara, 1993:125-129; Paine, 1994:134-167). 
Combined with other challenges, such as en-
vironmental factors and the lack of trust in the 
co-management system, this situation led to a 
new reindeer husbandry law in 2007 (Ulveva-
det, 2008:66). Nevertheless, establishing a sys-
tem of representation in which the Sami pas-
toralists feel that their voices are being heard 
is a challenging task. This problem is a central 
theme of this article. 
In the following, I focus on the regional 
management level of the reindeer husbandry 
system, the area boards. The Area Board is a 
professional advisor and a premise provider for 
the public management of reindeer husbandry 
in each of the six reindeer husbandry areas in 
Norway: South Trøndelag/Hedmark, North 
Trøndelag, Nordland, Troms, West Finnmark 
and East Finnmark (see Fig. 1 in Ulvevadet, 
2008).2 The area boards are tasked with man-
aging a wide array of challenging issues that di-
rectly affect users, e.g., recruitment (§2), siida3 
shares (§3-8), fences (§9-10), reindeer popula-
tion and use rules (§13-15), grazing times and 
2 This figure is found at http://www.ub.uit.no/
baser/septentrio/index.php/rangifer/article/
viewFile/156/145.
3 Reindeer are individually owned and herded col-
lectively, usually by kinship groups. This labour 
unit consists of the siida. The families are likely 
to group and regroup in different formations 
over the course of the year (Sara, 1993:31-32; 
Karlstad, 1998; Solem, 1970:190).
zones (§16-17), penalties (§20-24), and land 
use (§26) (Instruks for områdestyrene [Area 
Board guidelines]). In sum, users are widely 
involved in the development of both prem-
ises and decisions in the management system. 
Therefore, reindeer husbandry provides a use-
ful prism through which one can view issues 
related to “co-management.”
The main purpose of co-management is to 
increase the legitimacy of the management 
system by involving user-group representatives 
in the decision-making process. This practice 
is believed to lead to less conflict among the 
resource users and between the management 
authorities and resource users. Involving user 
groups in the decision-making process also 
leads to a higher degree of compliance with 
regulations and thus, a more sustainable ap-
proach to resource exploitation (Jentoft, 
1989:139; 1998:175-176; McCay, 1996:120; 
Mikalsen & Jentoft, 2001:281; Armitage et 
al., 2007:3; Sandström & Rova, 2010). Co-
management refers to a partnership between 
public and private actors (Carlsson & Berkes, 
2005:67). It is an arrangement that invests a 
substantial degree of power in the resource 
users (Wilson, 2003:28). This arrangement is 
not a fixed state but rather a process (Carls-
son & Berkes, 2005:67). However, for co-
management to succeed, power and authority 
must be perceived as legitimate and responsible 
by the resource users and by the management 
authorities at the highest levels, e.g., govern-
mental bodies (Jentoft, 1989:145-147; 1998: 
79; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997:469; Kalstad, 
1998:239). 
The Norwegian state deems this system to be 
“self-governance,” which suggests that a higher 
degree of self-management increases the cred-
ibility of the system both within the reindeer 
husbandry industry and in relation to other 
user interests. The state authorities also argue 
that such self-regulation brings local knowl-
edge into the management system (Ot. prp. nr. 
25 (2006-2007) pp. 31-32, 45). 
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Although the co-management system dis-
cussed in this article comprises a high number 
of users, e.g., Sami pastoralists, some users still 
consider the co-management system to be an 
organization that represents only certain inter-
ests rather than all of the interests that deserve 
to be considered. At the outset, this discrepancy 
suggests that it is difficult to implement a sys-
tem with fair and equal user-group representa-
tion that satisfies the requirements of all users. 
Society consists of an infinite number of het-
erogeneous interests, and incorporating all of 
them into a system based on user participation 
is impossible (Dahl, 1989:30; Mikalsen & Jen-
toft, 2001:282-284; Jentoft et al., 2003:282). 
The same is also true in reindeer husbandry. 
In this study, I address the following questions; 
What are the challenges involved in establishing 
a system of representation that encompasses all in-
terests? Which elements of the system of representa-
tion are not functioning as intended?
To answer these questions, I begin by out-
lining the different perspectives on representa-
tion. First, I discuss the theoretical implications 
of the term “representation” and the problems 
that representation entails. Management sys-
tem representatives as well as the relationship 
between representatives and their constituents 
are emphasized. Second, I describe the man-
agement structure, i.e., the regional Area Board 
system and the appointment procedures. 
Third, I discuss the theoretical issue of repre-
sentation as it relates to the empirical focus of 
this article by analyzing the different aspects of 
representation in the reindeer husbandry in-
dustry. Finally, I discuss certain challenges that 
representative systems face, such as fair and 
equal representation and arm’s length decision 
making.
Methodologically, the article is based both 
on data from documents and interviews with 
the representatives of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Food (MAF), the Sami Parliament, 
the Reindeer Husbandry Administration (at 
the national and regional levels) (RA), the 
Sami Reindeer Herders’ Association of Norway 
(NRL4), and the national, regional, and local 
co-management boards. I interviewed twen-
ty-five persons from 2006 to 2008. Approxi-
mately half of them were interviewed three 
to five times. During the fall of 2010, I also 
conducted a series of open-ended phone inter-
views with eighteen of the present and previ-
ous representatives of the six area boards along 
with one employee from each of the six local 
RAs. I interviewed both types of board repre-
sentatives, user representatives as well as non-
user representatives, to compare their views of 
the area boards and their perceptions of the 
boards’ work. The statements from previous 
and current board members are anonymous.5 
In total, I interviewed nearly fifty individuals 
involved in the reindeer husbandry manage-
ment system.  
Theory
Co-management
Scholars commonly assume that a manage-
ment system relying on a deliberate agreement 
is more legitimate and hence more robust 
than a management system that solely re-
lies on force and penalty (Jentoft, 1989:139-
140; 1998:164-165; 2000:141; Berkes et al., 
1991:12-13; Berkes, 1994:20; 1995:371; 
Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997:465-466; Armit-
age et al., 2007:1; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 
2007:52-57). Co-management systems are 
4 In Norwegian: Norges Reindriftssamers Lands-
forbund.
5 I interviewed fewer Area Board representatives 
from East Finnmark than from the other areas 
because reaching them by phone was difficult 
and because the representatives did not respond 
to my e-mails. Citations in the text are not nec-
essarily those of current board representatives; 
the citations may also be from previous board 
representatives. All citations used in this article 
are from Sami pastoralists in current and previ-
ous boards.
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based on management functions delegated to 
user organizations that make autonomous de-
cisions. Hence, users become directly involved 
in the management process and assume both 
rights and responsibilities within the manage-
ment system (Berkes et al., 1991:12; 1995:373; 
Jentoft, 2003:4). “But the degree of autonomy, 
delegations and decentralization may vary be-
tween levels. Co-management is formal, it has 
a charter, it specifies mandates, membership 
and procedures for election, representation 
and provision for scientific advice” (Jentoft, 
2003:4). This additional level of formality in-
creases the users’ adherence to rules and regula-
tions. One may call this level the moral aspect 
of the management system because the percep-
tion of the management system’s legitimacy is 
ultimately a question of the users’ moral per-
ceptions of the management system (Jentoft, 
1989:139; 1998:72; Pinkerton, 1989:5, 30; 
Singelton, 2000:6). 
However, a management system is also le-
gitimate in the sense that it has instrumental 
validity. Instrumental validity means that the 
system itself serves to accomplish its goals, 
such as conservation, sustainability, and eco-
nomic efficiency. Instrumental validity also 
includes procedures because legitimacy may 
also be perceived in terms of the manner in 
which decisions are made. For this reason, it 
is important to distinguish between moral and 
instrumental legitimacy because one type of 
legitimacy may not relate to the other. They 
may even be in conflict. Because user partici-
pation increases the legitimacy of its manage-
ment system, groups outside the process may 
view this conferral of legitimacy as a step in the 
wrong direction. They may do so because the 
increased participation of one group may lead 
to the numerical marginalization of the other 
groups under the same management system 
(Jentoft, 1989:145-146; 1998:176; 2000:145; 
Hanna, 1998:S173; Mikalsen & Jentoft, 
2001:284, 292; Nielsen, 2003:427-430; Zach-
risson, 2004:22-23; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 
2007:337-338; Connelly, 2011:932).
Representation
Representation occurs in various forms, in-
cluding functional and territorial/geographi-
cal representation (Jentoft et al., 2003:284). 
An essential claim of democratic theory is that 
democracy itself causes governments to be rep-
resentative, although the views on the expect-
ed duties of a representative body of citizens 
diverge (Manin et al., 1999:4-5). The term 
“representation” implies that the representa-
tives forward the interest of the public and/or 
those they represent. Therefore, the connec-
tions between the representative institution, 
the government and the people are important 
to understanding how democracy becomes 
legitimate (Manin et al., 1999:2). Co-man-
agement arrangements are no exception. The 
government delegates authority to the repre-
sentative institution, and the representatives 
promote the interests of the electors by making 
decisions on behalf of the citizens that elected 
them (Jentoft et al., 2003:285-287). The same 
is true for the reindeer husbandry industry in 
Norway. 
One problem is that as the organization 
becomes larger, it becomes more difficult to 
maintain a democratic process based on direct 
participation because of the problems associ-
ated with the aggregation of interests. Aggrega-
tion is a process whereby the people involved 
‘deliver’ their demands to a higher body, which 
must then identify the solutions that best meet 
the needs of all of the citizens (Dahl, 1989:30; 
Jentoft & McCay, 1995:234; Plotke, 1997:28-
29). To some extent, one may claim that the 
problem with aggregation is related to identi-
fying a representative cross-section of all of the 
interests that are to be represented. The more 
people are represented by one representative, 
the more interests must be aggregated, and the 
more challenging it is to identify the interests 
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of those represented. This appears to be one 
of several issues affecting the larger reindeer-
husbandry areas. 
Systems of representation can be implement-
ed in various ways. The two most common 
forms are systems in which the representatives 
act on the direct demands of the constituents 
or in which the representatives act on what 
they perceive to be the best interest of the pub-
lic (Manin et al., 1999:2). An essential point 
in the latter is that the elected person’s knowl-
edge and experience allows him/her to act in 
the overall best interests of the constituents 
(Mitchell, 1997:161-162; Plotke, 1997:28-
29). Such an arrangement requires trust be-
tween representatives and constituents (Pur-
due, 2001:2213-2214). Both of these forms 
are believed to be ways in which the public’s 
best interest is expressed in a democratic fash-
ion (Manin et al., 1999:2).
Representatives and authority 
In democratic countries today, we often find a 
pluralist political system with many different 
representative groups (Dahl, 1989:30). Given 
the increasing ethnic, cultural, and economic 
diversity in society and the increasing number 
of non-governmental organizations seeking 
influence, questions regarding the account-
ability and representativeness of both council-
ors and leaders are commonly discussed in the 
academic literature. Who are these individuals 
representing in reality? It is difficult for a group 
of representatives to represent multiple publics 
and a fragmented set of interests. The repre-
sentatives also need to balance their ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ roles, especially with respect to 
issues of power, conflict and collaboration. 
This balancing act is a difficult task, and the 
representatives often encounter criticism (Jen-
toft, 1998:431; Taylor, 2003:132; Gaventa, 
2004:11; Häikiö, 2007:2157-2158). 
There are many considerations to take into 
account when considering systems of repre-
sentation among board members that are ap-
pointed politically. It is not unusual to observe 
that a smaller group inhabits these positions, 
and that they are reelected multiple times (Tay-
lor, 2003:184; Gaventa, 2004:13). There may 
be a number of reasons for this phenomenon. 
For instance, the representative position might 
be highly politicized, with mobilized interests 
and a struggle for power in which only the 
strongest candidates win (Pomeroy & Berkes, 
1997:478; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006:305). In 
the case of reindeer husbandry, these elements 
are also reflected in some areas. Przeworski ar-
gues that decision making is generally delegat-
ed to representatives because they have privi-
leged knowledge of the issues (Prezeworski, 
2003:95), which also holds true for the repre-
sentatives appointed in the reindeer husbandry 
industry. 
One might also imagine that power is transi-
tive: if someone gains power in one political 
sphere, she/he also gains power in other related 
political spheres. Such transitivity is generated 
both because power in itself may be transitive 
but also because members reinforce networks 
by electing one another to an expanding num-
ber of positions as the network itself expands 
(Palmer et al., 1986:8). 
Nevertheless, if all interests are to be equally 
and fairly represented in each board constella-
tion, it is important to prevent uneven distri-
butions in which some groups achieve higher 
representation than others. If not, elements 
of conflict will be built into the structure of 
the board, and the relationships between 
stakeholders and the board may suffer (Scott 
2003:20). This balance is difficult to find, and 
it becomes especially pertinent when discuss-
ing co-management systems. Such systems are 
characterized by the participation of many dif-
ferent actors with differences in social status, 
power, and knowledge, all of which affect the 
way that the system works (Mikalsen & Jen-
toft 2001:284; Jentoft et al., 2003; Häikiö, 
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2007:2159). Conflicts regarding legitimate 
representation and participation are especially 
noted at the local level, which historically has 
been understood as the key site for democracy 
building and citizen participation. However, in 
smaller communities, residents typically come 
into contact with politicians or public officials 
on a face-to-face basis. Because of the closeness 
of these social relations, personal relations may 
have an effect on executive behaviour (Lowdes, 
1995:161). As will be discussed later, a number 
of these observations are also relevant to the 
reindeer husbandry co-management system.  
Management of reindeer husbandry in Nor­
way
This section outlines several of the factors in-
volved in reindeer husbandry management in 
Norway. First, I offer a general overview of the 
reindeer husbandry co-management system. 
Second, I describe the co-management govern-
ing boards’ appointment system. Third, the six 
reindeer husbandry areas are described in Table 
1, in order to show the context in which the 
governing boards operate in the different hus-
bandry areas.
The management structure 
Power sharing as a governance principle was 
introduced for the first time in Norwegian 
reindeer husbandry through “the reindeer hus-
bandry law” in 1978 (Lov om reindrift av 9. 
juni 1978 nr. 49 (Reindriftsloven) [The Rein-
deer Husbandry Law]). In essence, the law 
enacted a co-management system that was de-
signed to include various user groups and stake-
holders at all levels of the governance chain. 
As shown in Fig. 5 in Ulvevadet (2008),6 the 
geographical structure of the co-management 
boards at both the regional level (area boards) 
and the local level (district boards) covers all of 
the areas in which Sami reindeer husbandry is 
6  This figure is found at http://www.ub.uit.no/baser/sep-
tentrio/index.php/rangifer/article/viewFile/156/145.
performed. In this way, board representatives 
are in a position to address the interests and 
needs of the pastoralists and other stakeholders 
in the various regions. As seen, the geographi-
cal distribution of the co-management systems 
is quite extensive.
The government delegates important tasks to 
the Reindeer Husbandry Board, which com-
bines advisory and management roles. The 
board supervises the six area boards and serves 
as an appeals system for the decisions made by 
the area boards. The management tasks of the 
central Reindeer Husbandry Board include al-
locating and distributing pasture areas, deter-
mining grazing times and zones, and approv-
ing and controlling the number of reindeer 
in each siida. The area boards are primarily 
professional advisors who lay the groundwork 
for regional public management pertaining to 
reindeer husbandry. The area boards report 
on their activities to the Reindeer Husbandry 
Board. These activities include commenting on 
plans made by county municipalities, control-
ling and assessing new recruits to the industry, 
and a wide range of other administrative tasks 
related to regional issues. In sum, the Reindeer 
Husbandry Board and the six area boards make 
important strategic and practical decisions re-
lated to the industry’s development. At an even 
lower geographical level, the district boards 
and the siida boards manage practical matters 
and implement policies and regulations at the 
local level (Lov om reindrift av 15. juni 2007 
nr. 40 (Reindriftsloven) [Reindeer Husbandry 
Law], §43-44, §71-72).
In addition to this fourfold structure, a sepa-
rate structure has also been established to pro-
vide administrative services to the industry and 
its management system. The Reindeer Hus-
bandry Administration (RA) is a state govern-
ment directorate under the MAF and located 
in Alta, West Finnmark. There are also six area 
RAs, one in each of the six main herding ar-
eas at the regional level. The RA in Alta is the 
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secretariat for the Reindeer Husbandry Board, 
and the six regional RAs serve as the secretary 
for the area boards in each of the six herding 
areas. These regional government agencies pro-
vide pastoralists with assistance and advice and 
can be considered as both service and admin-
istrative units (Reindriftsforvaltningen [Nor-
wegian Reindeer Husbandry Administration], 
2008:1).
The structure of the Sami pastoralists’ organiza-
tion (NRL)
The NRL is the interest organization of the 
reindeer husbandry industry. The organization 
has an executive national unit and six regional 
branches (one in each reindeer herding area). 
The Sami pastoralists are democratically elect-
ed by the members of the NRL to the national 
and regional boards as long as the pastoralists 
are also members of the NRL. The representa-
tives’ tasks are to protect the interests of the 
Sami pastoralists and represent their interests 
in the annual negotiations with the MAF. The 
NRL and MAF negotiate an annual agreement 
that constitutes the economic and political 
vehicle that the state uses to achieve its vari-
ous goals for the industry. The NRL does not 
have the authority to appoint members to the 
Reindeer Husbandry Board and the six area 
boards, but it has the right to nominate board 
members to the appointing bodies, the County 
Council, the Sami Parliament, and the MAF 
(Bull, 1997:19; Kalstad, 1999:204-206; Ul-
vevadet, 2004:123; 2008:59-61). 
Appointments and politics
In the period of time from the implementa-
tion of the law in 1978 to 1996, the MAF 
appointed the representatives of the Reindeer 
Husbandry Board, and the County Councils 
appointed the representatives of the six area 
boards (Bull, 1995:398). The appointment 
system was revised in 1996. It was important 
to include the Sami Parliament in the reindeer 
husbandry management system because the 
Sami Parliament played a vital role in the Sami 
political development in Norway in general 
(Landbruksdepartementet [Ministry of Agri-
culture and Food], 1992:87-88). After 1996, 
the Sami Parliament became a part of the rein-
deer husbandry management structure. 
The Area Board is a governmental collegiate 
management institution at the regional level. 
The area boards were originally designed to 
establish a public management body at the re-
gional level that was responsible for controlling 
and managing the tasks (both those decreed by 
law and others) that were initially delegated 
to the district boards. Government papers, 
especially the proposition of the 1978 Rein-
deer Husbandry Law, emphasized the need 
for representatives with privileged knowledge 
who could handle these types of tasks because 
of the area boards’ regional origins (Ot. prp. 
nr. 9 (1976-1977) pp. 54-55; Ot. prp. nr. 25 
(2006-2007) pp. 16). Thus, the Area Board 
was not meant to be a political body in which 
the delegates and members of political parties 
pursue their own goals and in which the ma-
jority wins. The law (2007) states that when 
Area Board representatives are appointed, the 
County Council, the Sami Parliament and the 
MAF must look for the following: (1) a rea-
sonable geographical distribution, (2) broad 
professional qualifications, and to the greatest 
possible extent, (3) equal gender distribution. 
Additionally, there must be active pastoralists 
among the members (Instruks for områdestyr-
ene [Area Board guidelines], 2009, §1).7 
The Sami Parliament is a democratically 
elected political organization. All Norwegian 
Sami have the right to vote in the election ev-
ery four years, following the election cycle of 
the Norwegian Parliament. According to the 
7 It is important to note that the MAF has the 
right to review and reverse the decisions made 
by the area boards and has done so on several 
occasions.
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Sami Parliament, there are no specific require-
ments for the people who may be appointed 
to the area boards or to the Reindeer Hus-
bandry Board. Thus, the parliament establishes 
its own election criteria. Moreover, the Sami 
Parliament has not made any rules, guidelines 
or mandate that can impose demands or re-
strictions on the appointed representatives 
once they become board members. Instead, 
a practice has been established in which the 
representatives are primarily chosen for their 
knowledge, gender, connections to reindeer 
husbandry and geographical origins. The NRL 
has a legally granted right to nominate candi-
dates to the Reindeer Husbandry Board and 
the Area Board. Therefore, the Sami Parlia-
ment routinely considers suggestions made by 
the NRL. Additionally, the Sami Parliament 
Executive Council (Sametingsrådet) routinely 
asks the political groups to suggest represen-
tatives before the appointment process starts. 
Thus, when finally appointing members to the 
boards, the Sami Parliament Executive Council 
considers suggestions from both the political 
groups in the Sami Parliament and the NRL8. 
The Sami Parliament Executive Council has 
discussed whether it should establish a set of 
guidelines for the board members they ap-
point. If the Sami Parliament introduces such 
guidelines, the Sami Parliament, according to 
their own understanding, may also choose to 
appoint representatives (Sami pastoralists) who 
are not members of political parties. With a 
guide for its appointees, the Sami Parliament 
8  The Sami Parliament Executive Council has al-
ways appointed representatives with connections 
to reindeer husbandry. Nevertheless, the NRL 
and other Sami pastoralists have criticized the 
council over the years. The main criticism has 
been that the appointed representatives have not 
been active pastoralists and that the Sami Parlia-
ment Executive Council is more occupied with 
appointing members based on political affilia-
tion than appointing members who can perform 
well in the boards.     
can focus more on finding the most qualified 
candidates irrespective of their political ori-
entations. According to the Sami Parliament, 
such guidance will, inter alia, require the repre-
sentatives to keep the Sami Parliament Execu-
tive Council informed about the board’s po-
litical work. In this way, the Sami Parliament 
can influence the representatives’ positions in 
cases of political importance. A mandate may 
also provide the representatives with an insti-
tutional arrangement through which they may 
receive help from experienced people in the 
Sami Parliament, if such people are available. 
Such an arrangement may also serve to render 
the appointed members the formal agents of 
the Sami Parliaments in the management of 
reindeer husbandry. The Sami Parliament Ex-
ecutive Council considers the representatives 
it appoints as an unused resource because the 
Sami Parliament and the representatives are 
decoupled. Thus, this discussion may be con-
sidered as a means of identifying an integrated 
platform. 
The County Council is the other institution 
that appoints members to the area boards. This 
council is the highest elected political body in 
each county, such as Finnmark. The County 
Council is elected every fourth year at the mid-
term of the Norwegian Parliament. The Coun-
cil appoints members based on the constella-
tion of political parties in the County Council. 
Whether the representatives have significant 
knowledge of reindeer husbandry does not 
necessarily matter. In reality, however, the rep-
resentatives appointed by the County Council 
are local politicians who tend to have extensive 
political experience. The County Council, the 
Sami Parliament and the NRL are only respon-
sible for appointing representatives. Once the 
representatives are formally members of the 
boards, there is no part of the system in place 
to guide, train or support them. 
Table 1 depicts the six reindeer husbandry ar-
eas. The number of people involved in reindeer 
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Table 1. An overview of the six reindeer husbandry areas.
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a) In the early 1990s, as a result of internal rivalry in the industry, the Sami pastoralists from the islands and peninsulas of Troms established 
their own organization (Ytre Troms Reinsamelag). At the outset, this branch was a local branch of the NRL and represented the interests of 
the Sami pastoralists on the islands and peninsulas of Troms. The members of the new organization wished to have the same power and the 
same rights as the original local NRL branch in Troms. The board representatives of the NRL at the national level agreed that the organization 
could be formally established as a second local branch of the NRL in the county. However, the representatives agreed that the organization 
would not receive financial support or have the right to nominate board members at the same level as the original NRL branch.
b) The fact that Finnmark has a reindeer population that far exceeds the carrying capacity of the available pastures is the most important 
challenge for reindeer pastoralism in Finnmark. This situation has numerous consequences. If the Sami pastoralists have larger herds than 
the winter grazing territory (winter siida) can support, the Sami pastoralists compensate by moving into pastures outside their traditional 
territories by crossing boundaries into the territories of other siidas. This situation leads to social tensions and conflicts among the Sami 
pastoralists and among the different siidas (Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2009:3-4).
c) Cases regarding social conflicts are difficult to address. To prevent any involved parties from feeling that the Area Board representatives have 
made decisions based on personal preferences, the board has suggested sending this type of case to be considered by the Area Board in Troms. 
d) The reindeer Husbandry Law of 2007 introduced a system in which the district boards had to design a number of rules that subsequently 
were validated or rejected by the area boards. The intent behind the system was to grant districts more self-determination when organizing 
their activities. These activities included the rules of pasture use, fence maintenance, use of motorized vehicles, and – perhaps most important 
– determination of an ecologically sustainable reindeer population. The current Area Board representatives, who were appointed for the 
2008-2012 cycle, are the first to be responsible for approving the self-designed rules established by the district boards. These new tasks 
present additional challenges to the Finnmark districts because the system must adjust the number of reindeer to the pasture capacity and 
allocate the pastures to each siida based on historical use and legal rights (Reindriftsloven [Reindeer Husbandry Law], 2007, §§57-60; 
Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2009:4). 
e) In Finnmark, only the coastal summer pastures have formal borders. The remaining seasonal inland pastures are shared by the Sami pastoralists 
and are referred to in the Reindeer Husbandry Law as “common pastures.” No individual or siida rights of use have been specified for the 
common fall, winter, and spring pastures, but the Sami pastoralists do have informal, traditional areas. However, the increase in the number 
of reindeer and Sami pastoralists have destabilized these boundaries and undermined the informal, traditional management system (Reindeer 
Husbandry Administration, 2009; Ulvevadet & Hausner, 2011:2796).  
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husbandry in each area determines how many 
groups of Sami pastoralists are administered 
and managed by the various area boards. The 
different types of land use determine the types 
of conflicts and problems that the Sami pasto-
ralists experience in the various areas, includ-
ing conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. 
The primary challenges in each area reflect the 
type of cases the area boards normally handle. 
The composition of the representatives in the 
various area boards (in terms of the number of 
Sami pastoralists) provides information about 
the power of the reindeer husbandry industry 
in the co-management system. If Sami pasto-
ralists constitute the minority, they will most 
likely be voted down when the board makes 
its decisions, especially in the cases in which 
the interests of the Sami pastoralists and non-
pastoralists collide. 
Issues in the co­management of reindeer hus­
bandry – legitimacy, representation, and scale
In this article, I posed a research question ask-
ing why it is difficult to accommodate all inter-
ests and asking which elements of the represen-
tation system are not functioning as intended. 
The first part of this section discusses represen-
tation associated with distribution of interests 
and procedural legitimacy. Although formal 
procedures were followed in the Area Board in 
Troms, the outcome was not always optimal 
for all parties. The second part of this section 
discusses the autonomy and flexibility of repre-
sentatives as well as how these factors affect the 
legitimacy of the decisions made by the boards. 
The last part discusses how the size of an area 
may affect the work of the area boards. 
Procedural legitimacy 
The participative component of the co-man-
agement system in the Sami reindeer hus-
bandry industry in Norway is organized ac-
cording to geographical criteria because the 
Sami pastoralists experience specific challenges 
depending on where they keep their herds. The 
organization allows for the management sys-
tem to be adapted to local challenges, regard-
less of whether these challenges are ecological, 
economic, social and/or political in nature. 
Additionally, geographical representation en-
ables regional public interests to be included 
and thereby strengthens the support for the 
system (Sara, 1993:123-130; Paine, 1994:99-
105; Ulvevadet, 2000:63-64; 2001:103-108). 
However, one problem is that only a subset 
of interests is granted membership in the rep-
resentation system, whose decisions affect a 
larger group of people (Dahl, 1989:230-231). 
To meet this challenge, the appointing bodies 
are instructed to search for a group of appoin-
tees with a reasonable geographic distribution 
(Area Boards guidelines, 2009, §1) to include 
multiple interests in the boards.
An overview of all of the Area Board repre-
sentatives in Troms from 1979 to 2011 dem-
onstrate that a majority of the Sami pastoral-
ists who have been on the boards are from the 
inland districts of Troms, which is close to the 
Swedish boarder. The representatives from the 
districts that are located on the islands and pen-
insulas of Troms have been members of the mi-
nority for nearly the entire period that the co-
management system has been in existence. The 
interviews with the Area Board representatives 
and the information from the Sami Parliament 
also demonstrate that there are few politically 
active Sami pastoralists in general. Therefore, it 
is difficult to locate Sami pastoralists with po-
litical experience from all of the geographical 
areas. These statements appear to be counter-
intuitive because the aforementioned second 
reindeer husbandry organization (see Table 1, 
a) was established in Troms to pursue the inter-
ests of the Sami pastoralists living in the coastal 
districts. This specific case merits further atten-
tion. At the outset, the establishment of the 
new organization indicates that the Sami pas-
toralists from coastal districts were not satisfied 
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with the strong representation from the inner 
districts, and it may be a signal that decisions 
made in the area board were not considered 
legitimate by this group of Sami pastoralists. 
This finding also demonstrates that there was 
a lack of trust between the constituents from 
the coastal districts and the board representa-
tives appointed from the inland districts, even 
though the board representatives were ap-
pointed because of their privileged knowledge 
and their abilities to identify solutions that best 
would serve everyone involved. 
Political engagement increases the represen-
tatives’ understanding of the socio-political 
processes in society and thus also increases their 
abilities to look beyond their personal interests 
in their work. Politically active people become 
trained to use a wider perspective if they must 
make difficult decisions. If important princi-
ples are at stake (Prezeworski, 2003:95), they 
must produce results that favor the greater 
common good (Dahl, 1989:30; Jentoft & 
McCay, 1995:234; Mitchell, 1997:161-162). 
Nevertheless, Jentoft argues that the system 
is only legitimate if it works both instrumen-
tally and morally among the users (Jentoft, 
1998:176; 2000:145; Zachrisson, 2004:22-
23; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007:337-338). 
That is, a procedurally correct appointment 
process is not always sufficient, as witnessed in 
Troms. A person from Troms stated the follow-
ing: “Leadership and majority [of representa-
tives] in the Area Board should rotate between 
the inland and coastal groups of Sami pasto-
ralists. When the power is unequally distrib-
uted outside the Area Board, it becomes un-
equally distributed inside the Area Board. The 
law states that geography and gender must be 
considered [in the appointment process], but 
in this case geography is not taken into consid-
eration.” The problem that structural inequali-
ties become formalized and entrenched within 
the co-management systems is a well-known 
issue that is often difficult to detect (Mikalsen 
& Jentoft, 2001:284; Scott, 2003:20; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al., 2007; Häikiö, 2007:2159).
Moreover, many of the politically active Sami 
pastoralists from the inner districts are also ac-
tively involved in the politics of the NRL, and, 
therefore transitive power easily occurs. Given 
the NRL’s right to nominate board members to 
the County Council and the Sami Parliament, 
the Sami pastoralists from the inner districts 
achieve power in the co-management system 
through their vested power and their networks 
in the NRL. In other words, the Sami pasto-
ralists with a certain amount of power and a 
certain position in the NRL reinforce and ex-
pand their networks by electing one another to 
the Area Board through the County Council 
and the Sami Parliament. Power in one net-
work translates into power in another related 
network. This form of transitivity has been 
discussed in the academic literature (Palmer et 
al., 1986: 8). This arrangement does not sug-
gest that the reindeer husbandry management 
system is only serving political elites. However, 
for those who stand outside the system, this ar-
rangement may resemble elitism because the 
people who are recruited to the management 
system are limited to one interest organization 
(NRL). Moreover, the success of the system 
is affected by the extent to which the board 
members act in accordance with the proce-
dures anchored in the customs of the reindeer 
herding community and the extent to which 
the users perceive these procedures in the same 
way as the political actors. This issue has been 
discussed in the context of other sectors as well 
(Scott, 2003: 91-95; March & Olsen, 2006: 
12-13), but this does not seem to be the case 
in parts of Troms. This situation decreases the 
level of trust between the representatives and 
the constituents.
The MAF has the main responsibility for the 
boards and can ask for the appointment process 
to be reviewed if the criteria are not fulfilled 
(Area Board guidelines, 2009, §1). Accord-
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ing to the interviews, this review procedure 
has not been put into practice. A person from 
one of the southern areas stated, “The ministry 
[MAF] has never intervened in my 10 years in 
politics, and I don’t think it has ever done so.” 
In co-management systems, functions are del-
egated to user organizations that make autono-
mous decisions (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997:469; 
Jentoft, 1998:79; 2003:4; Kalstad, 1998:239). 
State interventions may decrease the represen-
tatives’ independence and undermine the co-
management system. Therefore, this balance 
between state intervention and autonomy is 
difficult to achieve, as is also the case in the 
reindeer husbandry co-management system. 
As a result, the state refrains from interfering 
in situations in which it should have taken 
an active role. The MAF may have refrained 
from intervening in the appointment process 
to prevent public scrutiny of the board’s inde-
pendence. 
User organizations also have certain respon-
sibilities if they join management systems (Ber-
kes et al., 1997:469; Jentoft, 1998: 165;2003: 
4). One important responsibility is to identify 
the compromises that suit all of the actors 
involved (Dahl, 1989:30; Jentoft & McCay, 
1995:234; Christensen et al., 2004:96-97). An-
other important responsibility is to ensure that 
elections are conducted as intended (Jentoft, 
2003; Connelly, 2011:932). This responsibil-
ity prevents conflicts that may arise if the board 
members and the institutions are not perceived 
to be accountable or if their decisions are not 
considered to be legitimate (whether in terms 
of procedure or outcome) (Jentoft, 1998:164-
168; Connelly, 2011:934).  
Neither the reindeer husbandry law nor the 
Area Board guidelines specify any requirements 
for the appointing bodies. They only state that 
the appointing bodies must seek a group of ap-
pointees with a reasonable geographic distribu-
tion, broad professional qualifications, and so-
cietal experience (Area Board guidelines, 2009, 
§1). These guidelines are rather diffuse and 
provide a considerable amount of discretion to 
the County Council, the Sami Parliament, and 
the regional branches of the NRL to form the 
system of representation as they wish. Howev-
er, the lack of boundaries between the different 
political systems may lead to network effects in 
the recruitment process, which may, in turn, 
cause issues of legitimacy to surface because the 
appointment process may be perceived as un-
fair to some groups. 
Representatives’ flexibility in their work in the 
area boards
In co-management, management functions 
are delegated to user organizations that make 
autonomous decisions (Pomeroy & Berkes, 
1997:469; Jentoft, 1998:79; 2003:4; Kalstad, 
1998:239). The following question then arises: 
how autonomous can local management be? 
One could argue that the lower the level of the 
management to which authority is delegated, 
the less independent the decisions will be. Ja-
cobsen supports this argument to an extent by 
contending that the relationship between poli-
tics and administration at the local level is reg-
ulated to a large degree by state management 
through various economic, legal, and norma-
tive incentives. In some ways, this arrangement 
decreases the opportunities for local politicians 
to exercise their flexibility on issues pertaining 
to their communities. However, rules, regula-
tions, and decisions made centrally must be 
interpreted and implemented within local 
communities by the local politicians and ad-
ministrators. This process gives local politicians 
and administrators considerable influence over 
the decision making process, although there 
are limits to this influence (Jacobsen, 2007:1-
2). 
This argument was also confirmed by sev-
eral Area Board representatives interviewed 
for this study. They respect that there are dif-
ferent laws, such as the Reindeer Husbandry 
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Law, the Law on Agriculture and Farming, and 
the Planning and Building Law, which must 
be considered before the area boards can make 
their decisions (see Table 1). Although the laws 
are important and impose certain limits, the 
representatives sense that they are an essential 
piece of the decision-making process. It was for 
instance said by different pastoralists, “I do feel 
that we have some say [in the Area Board]”. “I 
don’t feel bound [by the County Council]”. “I 
make decisions based on my own evaluations”. 
“Yes, I absolutely feel that we have influence 
through the [Area] Board.” In addition to their 
performances and assessments, their knowl-
edge and experience reflect the outcomes of 
many of the cases handled by the area boards. 
The Sami pastoralists truly feel that they are an 
active part of the reindeer husbandry manage-
ment system. 
As co-managers, the representatives must ad-
dress conflicting interests, some of which pres-
ent unpleasant challenges. For example, § 24 
in the Area Board guidelines 2009 and §79 in 
the Reindeer Husbandry Law of 2007 give the 
Area Board the right to enforce measures on the 
Sami pastoralists who do not follow instruc-
tions. These pastoralists may not have inten-
tionally broken the law. The pastoralists may be 
in a situation in which following instructions 
is difficult. For example, grazing or weather 
conditions may make moving their herds to 
their assigned grazing territories difficult or 
even impossible (Riseth, 2000:68; Ulvevadet, 
2001; Lie et al., 2008:89-90; Tømmervik et al., 
2009:254). Nonetheless, the Area Board has a 
mandate to intervene with strict measures in 
an objective way. They are appointed to make 
decisions that are founded on formal rules and 
regulations that are in everyone’s best interests. 
Generally, the representatives can rarely satisfy 
everyone, and they are also bound by external 
social, economic, legal, and political structures 
that impact their decisions (Jentoft, 1998:431; 
Gaventa, 2004:11). Some board members find 
this situation difficult and would like the gov-
ernment to enforce sanctions. One pastoralist 
stated, “When the agronomist makes a deci-
sion, for instance about forced close-down of 
somebody’s husbandry, I had hoped that some-
one at a higher level in the system would have 
followed this decision all the way through.” 
Recent research from Finnmark also confirms 
that many Sami pastoralists want a compe-
tent, independent authority to solve difficult 
distribution conflicts (Prestbakmo & Ravna, 
2009:223-224).
An important question is the degree of flexi-
bility desired by the Area Board representatives. 
They may not desire total freedom but may 
rather wish to make decisions and manage out-
comes within a well-founded legal framework. 
However, this arrangement gives the represen-
tatives fewer choices, as argued by Jacobsen 
(2007:211) in his research on municipalities 
in general. However, this arrangement may 
also give the representatives better guidance for 
making sound decisions. The representatives of 
the area boards in Finnmark stated that even if 
reindeer husbandry is often understood to be 
a way of life, it is still an industry. One board 
member said, “Even though customs, culture, 
and social relations are important factors af-
fecting the development of reindeer husband-
ry, one needs to look at the Sami pastoralists 
as entrepreneurs with professional and sound 
economic orientations. Most business owners 
in all types of industries need to make tough 
decisions in order to stay alive. However, to es-
cape criticism and avoid accusations of bias, as 
discussed in the theoretical literature (Jentoft, 
1998:431; Scott, 2003; Gaventa, 2004:11), 
the Area Board representatives in West Finn-
mark wish to send cases regarding internal 
conflicts to the Area Board in Troms for fur-
ther treatment (see Table 1, d). One of the 
representatives stated the following: “We want 
to send difficult cases to [the Area Board in] 
Troms, so we won’t have any problems or ques-
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tions regarding legal incompetence. This does 
not necessarily mean that we are incompetent 
legally when we treat cases, but other people 
may think that we are. Besides, other people 
outside the area [in West Finnmark] may look 
at the case from a different angle.” 
The research on fisheries co-management has 
followed a different line of development be-
cause fishermen’s representatives usually work 
within a fixed mandate from the organizations 
that they represent (Jentoft, 2000:144; Jen-
toft et al., 2003:284). The representatives ap-
pointed by the Sami Parliament do not have a 
specific mandate. The interviewed representa-
tives, especially those on the boards in which 
the Sami pastoralists are in the minority, stated 
that a closer dialogue with the Sami Parliament 
would be beneficial. For example, a more struc-
tured dialogue during the election cycle would 
be useful. One representative said, “It would 
have been really nice with a closer connection 
with the Sami Parliament in order to get some 
help and input in some of the cases. (….) If 
we are not able to do the work we are set to 
do in a democratically elected body, the result 
will not be democracy.” Another person said, 
“The Sami Parliament should have sent an ob-
server to the meetings. But this has of course to 
do with time and resources” [available in the 
Sami Parliament]. Both statements were made 
by persons who were in the minority in their 
respective area boards and who were constantly 
voted down by the majority of the representa-
tives who came from outside of the reindeer 
husbandry industry. 
This idea has also been discussed in the 
Sami Parliament. The system was not de-
signed this way because the area boards were 
originally designed to be governmental col-
legiate management bodies (Ot. prp. nr. 9 
(1976-77) pp. 54-55). However, when it was 
decided that politically elected bodies, such as 
the County Council and the Sami Parliament, 
were to be responsible for the appointment 
of board members, this policy influenced the 
area boards. As a consequence, the area boards 
developed into political management bod-
ies. Organizational systems have a tendency 
to develop into different forms depending on 
their contexts and pre-established institutions 
(Jentoft et al., 1998:431; Young, 2002; Scott, 
2003:23; March & Olsen, 2006:14-17). Like-
wise, the area boards transformed into politi-
cal boards whose compositions depend on the 
constellation of political parties in the County 
Council and the Sami Parliament.
The Sami Parliament has experienced politi-
cians who can teach Area Board representatives 
the required legal-case administration skills, 
communicative proficiency, and other skills 
that are important to their work. Because the 
Area Board system operates differently from 
the original design, there are no formal link-
ages between the Area Board representatives 
and the Sami Parliament after the members 
are appointed. According to the interviews, the 
Sami pastoralists on the boards do not wish to 
be controlled or mandated by the Sami Parlia-
ment, although some of them believe that addi-
tional support and dialogue would be helpful. 
Nevertheless, the representatives need flex-
ibility and independence to make sound deci-
sions in each case. Drawing upon past research 
on the fisheries, Jentoft argues that the fixed 
mandate restricts the representatives’ choices, 
which sometimes harms the relationship be-
tween the representatives and the represented 
(Jentoft, 2000:144; Jentoft et al., 2003:284). 
In the context of reindeer husbandry co-
management, the representatives can be more 
flexible and independent. They can make au-
tonomous decisions that they believe are in the 
industry’s best interest. However, this freedom 
may lead to difficult relationships between the 
representatives and the represented because 
many decisions relate to difficult issues, such 
as distribution of pastures between individual 
Sami pastoralists or between groups of Sami 
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pastoralists. Those pastoralists negatively af-
fected by the decisions may not care whether 
the representatives have a mandate to follow or 
not, as long as the decisions contradict their 
particular interests. This sentiment affects the 
relationship between the representatives and 
their constituents. 
Size of the co-management area 
For the representatives to do their jobs well, 
there must be a strong connection not only be-
tween the state and the board but also between 
the board and their constituents (Manin et al., 
1999:2). The larger the scale of the system, the 
more difficult it is to establish close relation-
ships between the representatives and their 
constituents. This challenge is augmented by 
the problem of aggregation because identifying 
solutions that satisfy all or most of the constit-
uents becomes more difficult (Dahl, 1989:30; 
Jentoft, 1989:152; Pinkerton, 1989:28-29; 
Jentoft & McCay, 1995:234). This challenge is 
also evident in the current case of the reindeer 
husbandry industry.  
A close relationship between the representa-
tives and the represented opens channels for 
direct dialogue, something which some of the 
board representatives from the smaller areas 
outside Finnmark have discussed. Closeness 
allows the representatives to draw upon the 
knowledge and experience found among the 
Sami pastoralists from various reindeer hus-
bandry districts. A pastoralist from one of the 
smaller areas said, “I can discuss cases with 
districts affected by the same problems before 
meetings in our Area Board.” In this manner, 
the board members gain a better perspective on 
how the Sami pastoralists perceive certain mat-
ters. There are also problems with social rela-
tions of this type. Issues of legal incompetence 
are not unusual among local-level manage-
ment because of the tight social relations. The 
relationship between the individual and the or-
ganizational system is legally well defined but 
can become unclear in many situations (Sear-
ing, 1991:1248-1249; Biddle, 1986:82). A re-
cent report published by the MAF shows that 
people (i.e., both the Sami pastoralists and oth-
ers familiar with the reindeer husbandry) find 
it difficult to distinguish between the manage-
ment institutions and the industry as such. The 
report also found that the management institu-
tions do not have the necessary distance from 
the industry and that the industry is managed 
by people who also have private interests in the 
industry (Landbruks- og matdepartementet 
MAF, 2011a:8). Moreover, because social rela-
tions are transparent in small communities and 
because the social network inside the commu-
nity is also small, people frequently come into 
contact with public officials and local politi-
cians. In these local settings, questions regard-
ing legitimacy and legal competence may arise 
(Lowdes, 1995:161). Ultimately, this closeness 
may also decrease the constituents’ trust in the 
representatives if the board’s decisions have not 
been favorable.   
There is another problematic aspect of man-
agement in small communities. Research has 
revealed that municipal politicians in Norway 
at times are involved in preparation of cases 
which are sent to affected interest groups for 
comments and input, and where the same 
politicians appear in administrative positions 
in such groups and make comments and in-
put back to the municipal authorities (Jacob-
sen, 2007:235-239). Such conflicting roles 
are also found in the reindeer husbandry co-
management system. The representatives of the 
area boards are also members of the municipal 
council. In these cases, we find that the same 
people prepare a case for the municipal coun-
cil and also make assessments and decisions on 
the same case in the Area Board. This conflict 
of interest raises the question of whether the 
representatives can properly separate their dif-
ferent roles. 
The reindeer husbandry areas of the South 
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Trøndelag/Hedmark, North Trøndelag, Nord-
land, and Troms counties each have between 
150 and 224 users who comprise between 30 
and 46 groups of Sami pastoralists working to-
gether in each district (see Table 1) (Reindrifts-
forvaltningen, 2009:40, 50). At this scale, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the represen-
tatives might reach compromises that satisfy 
all of the parties involved. In the above areas, 
the interviewees argued that the connection 
between the representatives and their constitu-
ents were close enough that the representatives 
could initiate dialogues with district leaders. 
Additionally, conflicts were not reported to 
be a major problem in the areas outside Finn-
mark. This situation suggests that there are 
fewer interests to consider and that making de-
cisions that satisfy everyone involved is easier 
as a result. Similar results can be found in the 
academic literature regarding other contexts 
(Dahl, 1989:30; Pinkerton, 1989:29; Jentoft 
& McCay, 1995:235; Ostrom & Schlager, 
1996:142; Jentoft, 1998:172, 186).
However, in Finnmark, the situation is dif-
ferent. Here the area boards represent between 
938 and 1,370 individual Sami pastoralists 
who form 181 groups in West Finnmark and 
216 groups in East Finnmark (Reindriftsfor-
valtningen, 2009:50). Therefore, the probabil-
ity that the area boards in Finnmark reach a 
common agreement may be smaller than the 
probability for the area boards outside Finn-
mark to reach an agreement, as multiple in-
terests must be considered. However, the in-
terviews with current and former Area Board 
representatives indicate that the representatives 
were less concerned with the size of the area 
and more concerned with fulfilling their re-
sponsibilities. A person from Finnmark stated, 
“I don’t think that the size of our area matters 
as long as we treat cases according to [formal] 
procedures and make decisions in accordance 
with rules and regulations.” Another person 
said, “We do have many challenges to resolve 
due to the state’s unwillingness to interfere 
[with the management of reindeer husbandry] 
here in Finnmark.”
According to the interviews with the Area 
Board representatives in Finnmark, the diffi-
cult tasks are not directly related to the size of 
the co-management areas today but rather the 
impacts of the size and locations of the pasture 
areas on the management of reindeer husband-
ry in Finnmark over the past several decades. 
The Sami pastoralists in Finnmark were regu-
lated by law much later than the other areas. 
As a result, the industry has experienced less 
interference from outside industries, such as 
agriculture. Thus, the industry was able to de-
velop more freely in Finnmark than in the oth-
er areas (Berg, 1994:34-37; Riseth, 2000:136; 
Bull, 2001:101-102; Riseth & Vatn, 2009:99). 
This development has also likely strengthened 
the pastoralists as a cultural group and made 
them more autonomous. The MAF and the 
RA had a harder time managing (through co-
management boards) the reindeer husbandry 
industry in Finnmark when the co-manage-
ment system was implemented in 1978. In 
addition, because Finnmark encompasses 75% 
of all reindeer husbandry in Norway, the rein-
deer husbandry industry in Finnmark is a large 
system to manage. The co-management system 
has had difficulties controlling recruitment to 
the industry and the reindeer number from the 
mid 1970 and onwards. This development has 
deteriorated, as the MAF has been reluctant 
to intervene when the co-management system 
has experienced problems with local self-gover-
nance, as they have met resistance from some 
groups of pastoralists. Instead of “steering” the 
system toward a more sustainable direction, 
the state has been waiting for the Area Board 
representatives to accomplish this goal on their 
own (see Table 1, b, c, and e) (Ulvevadet & 
Hausner, 2011:2799-2800). This delay has de-
creased the management system’s instrumental 
legitimacy.
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Conclusion
In this article we have seen how the regional 
level of the co-management system in reindeer 
husbandry functions. Co-management usually 
connects the state and the users through co-
operation, communication, and power sharing 
(Kalstad, 1998:239; Armitage et al., 2007:3-
4). Theoretically, this type of cooperation 
is believed to establish collective legitimacy 
and support for the political system (Jentoft 
1989:139; 1998:175-176; McCay, 1996:120; 
Mikalsen & Jentoft, 2001:281; Armitage 
et al., 2007:3; Sandström & Rova, 2010). A 
functioning management system requires 
compliance. To obtain compliance, the regula-
tions must be perceived as legitimate (Hanna, 
1998:S173; Scott, 2003:91-95; March & Ol-
sen, 2006:12-13). They must also be the result 
of a fair process with an outcome that is ac-
ceptable to all of the parties involved (Jentoft, 
1989; Hanna, 1998:S173; Pomeroy & Berkes, 
1997; Borrini-Feyerabend, 2007:102). 
The co-management system of the reindeer 
husbandry industry in Norway is designed to 
include multiple interests in the area boards. 
However, experience from some of the areas 
shows that certain groups in the area boards al-
most always end up as a minority, e.g. the Sami 
pastoralists in South-Trøndelag/Hedmark and 
the Sami pastoralists from the coastal districts 
in Troms, both claim that they are voted down 
when important decisions are made. In some 
districts, this claim has led to a lack of trust 
between the representatives and the constitu-
ents. As a consequence, support for the system 
has diminished. Some groups of pastoralists do 
not feel that all representatives have relevant 
knowledge regarding this industry or the abil-
ity to make decisions that favor the greater 
common good, as discussed in the theoretical 
literature (Dahl, 1989:30; Jentoft & McCay, 
1995:234; Mitchell, 1997:161-162; Prezewor-
ski, 2003:95). 
It is often assumed that local managers have 
less autonomy and are more bounded by cen-
trally prepared decisions and regulations. How-
ever, past research on municipalities in Norway 
has found that there is some flexibility and 
autonomy at the local level of governance (Ja-
cobsen, 2007:1-2). This tendency has also ap-
peared in the field of reindeer husbandry man-
agement. All of the Area Board representatives 
interviewed in this study clearly understood 
their roles. Nevertheless, several representa-
tives noted the difficulties of sanctioning other 
pastoralists. These difficulties indicate that the 
responsibilities accompanying the role can be 
problematic. Scott argues that it is difficult to 
completely eliminate this dilemma because the 
role confusion occurs unconsciously (Scott, 
2003). This problem is also present in the rein-
deer husbandry co-management system (Min-
istry of Agriculture and Food, 2011a:8). 
The representatives from the area boards in 
small areas struggle with legal incompetence, 
whereas the representatives from the area 
boards in Finnmark struggle with addressing 
the unsustainable development of the industry 
in many parts of Finnmark. The findings in 
this study demonstrate that size impacts rep-
resentation systems because the smaller areas 
outside Finnmark have had more success with 
the co-management system than East and West 
Finnmark. However, other intervening factors 
have affected the regulatory development of 
the reindeer husbandry co-management sys-
tem in Finnmark. Compared with the smaller 
areas outside Finnmark, the larger areas of 
East and West Finnmark have been more dif-
ficult to manage than the smaller areas because 
of the later interference from the state. These 
factors, combined with other factors not dis-
cussed here, such as the subsidy system (Riseth 
& Vatn, 2009:100-101; Ulvevadet & Hausner, 
2011), have led to an expansion of the indus-
try in Finnmark in terms of the number of 
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both people and reindeer. This development 
has again led to a difficult resource situation 
(overgrazing) and unclear siida boundaries 
for resource use (Karlstad, 1998:247; Riseth, 
2000:174-178; Riseth & Vatn, 2009:102). Ac-
cording to Ostrom (1990), clear boundaries 
and defined rights to use resources are the basis 
of good management and sustainable devel-
opment (see also Pinkerton, 1989: 29; Ache-
son, 2006:127). The MAF often lists these 
two factors when political instruments fail to 
achieve their goals in the management of the 
Norwegian reindeer husbandry industry (Ot. 
prp. nr. 25 (2006-2007) pp. 32). However, 
Ostrom contends that if the rules are devised 
and managed by the resource users, the rules 
will be viewed as more legitimate and will 
lead to more successful management of com-
mon areas (Ostrom, 1990:88-90; Dolšak & 
Ostrom, 2003:22). Despite a co-management 
approach, this goal has been difficult to achieve 
in Finnmark. 
The state has hesitated to intervene in the 
unsustainable development of the industry in 
Finnmark (Hausner et al., 2011; Ulvevadet & 
Hausner, 2011). Additionally, the MAF and 
the RA have been criticized by the Office of 
the Auditor General (Riksrevisjonen) in its 
2003/2004 report for not handling the prob-
lem of the reindeer population and overgraz-
ing at a much earlier stage. The Office of the 
Auditor General has stated that the MAF and 
the RA have not accomplished the task set be-
fore them by the Norwegian Parliament. Their 
failure has decreased the management systems’ 
instrumental legitimacy. After the implemen-
tation of the 2007 law, this has become the 
responsibility of the district boards. The area 
boards are responsible for monitoring and con-
trolling the situation. Thus, the area boards 
have been delegated sensitive tasks and will 
likely face criticism for their work, which leads 
to diminished trust between the representatives 
and the constituents.9 The boards must handle 
difficult distribution issues and sanction those 
who do not adhere to the guidelines. In this 
process, it is important that the constituents 
view the boards’ work as legitimate (from both 
a moral and procedural perspective) such that 
those who are affected by the boards’ decisions 
support these decisions. 
The MAF recently proposed abolishing the 
regional area boards and suggested that all 
land-use cases affecting reindeer husbandry 
be handled by the County Governor’s Office, 
which has the professional capacity to handle 
such cases.10 The MAF further suggested that 
the County Governor’s Office should consult 
directly with the NRL and the Sami Parliament 
during this process. According to the state, this 
recommendation is primarily intended to sim-
plify the management system, to clearly distin-
guish between the industry and the manage-
ment system and to reduce the strong interest 
constellations found in the area boards today. 
The battle between the different interests does 
not result in the best overall solutions (Land-
bruks- og matdepartementet, 2011b:8-9). It is 
difficult to predict the consequences of such a 
change, but a rather obvious consequence is a 
strong reduction of the participatory aspect in 
the reindeer husbandry industry in Norway. 
Paradoxically, in some of the areas, this recom-
mendation may be the fairest solution to the 
problem of representation in the reindeer hus-
bandry industry in Norway.
9 The Reindeer Husbandry Law of 2007 has been 
in effect for 4 years, but the secondary laws have 
only been in effect for the last year or so.
10 The MAF informed the public about the chang-
es to the management system in April 2011. The 
proposition implementing the changes to the 
reindeer husbandry law was subsequently issued 
for consultation to the affected parties on Sep-
tember 30, 2011. 
Rangifer, 31 (1), 2011 179
Acknowledgements
This article was written under the Ecosystem Finnmark 
project which is a multidisciplinary research project fi-
nanced by the Norwegian Research Council.
References
Public documents
Instruks vedrørende områdestyrenes oppnevning og 
virksomhet. 2009. (Guidelines concerning appoint-
ment and work of the Area Board), prescribed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) Jan 5, 2009, 
cf. Reindeer Husbandry Law §72 and Royal Decree of 
Jun 15, 2007.
Landbruks­ og matdepartementet (MAF). 1992. Stor-
tingsmelding (Government white paper). Nr. 28 
(1991-1992). En bærekraftig reindrift (A sustainable 
reindeer husbandry). 
Landbruks­ og matdepartementet (MAF). 2006. Stort-
ingsproposisjon (Government white paper, propo-
sition) nr. 64 (2005-2006). Om reindriftsavtalen 
2006/2007, om dekning av kostnader vedrørende radi-
oaktivitet i reinkjøtt, og om endringer i statsbudsjettet 
for 2006 m.m. (On the reindeer husbandry agreement 
2006/2007, regarding financial compensation for ra-
dioactivity in reindeer meat and about changes in the 
state budget for 2006 and more).
Landbruks­ og matdepartementet (MAF). 2011a. Inter-
nevaluering av den offentlige forvaltningen av reindrif-
ten i Norge. Rapport fra arbeidsgruppen oppnevnt av 
Landbruks- og matdepartementet. (Internal evaluation 
of the public management of reindeer husbandry in 
Norway.) Nr 4, 2011. 12pp.
Landbruks­ og matdepartementet (MAF). 2011b. For-
slag til endringer i Lov om reindrift (reindriftsloven) av 
1. Juli 2007 – Høring. 
Lov om reindrift (Reindeer Husbandry Law) av 9. juni 
1978 nr. 49, med endringer, sist ved lov av 23.februar 
1996. Opphevet fra 01. juli, 2007 (of June 9, 1978, nr. 
49, with changes, most recently by law February 23, 
1996. Abolished on July 1, 2007).
Lov om reindrift (Reindeer Husbandry Law) av 15. juni 
2007 nr 40. (of June 15, 2007 nr. 40)
Ot. prp. nr. 25 (2006­2007) Om lov om reindrift (rein-
driftsloven) [Government white paper, proposition 
about a new reindeer husbandry law]. 
Ot. prp. nr. 9 (1976­1977) Om lov om reindrift (rein-
driftsloven) [Government white paper, proposition 
about a new reindeer husbandry law].
Reindriftsforvaltningen (RA). 2008. Ressursregnskapet for 
reindriftsnæringen (Ecological statistics of reindeer hus-
bandry) (1. april 2006 - 31 mars 2007). Reindriftsfor-
valtningen. 3+164pp.
Reindriftsforvaltningen (RA). 2009. Ressursregnskapet for 
reindriftsnæringen (Ecological statistics of reindeer hus-
bandry) (1. april 2007 - 31 mars 2008). Reindriftsfor-
valtningen. 3+164pp.
Riksrevisjonen (Office of the Auditor General). 2004. 
Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av bærekraftig bruk av 
reinbeiteressursene i Finnmark. (An investigation by 
the Office of the Auditor General of sustainable use 
of reindeer pastures in Finnmark. Dokument nr. 3:12 
(2003-04). 12pp. 
Literature 
Acheson, J.M. 2006. Institutional Failure in resources 
management. – The Annual Review of Anthropology 35: 
117-134.
Armitage, D., Berkes, F., & Doubleday, N. 2007. In-
troduction. Moving Beyond Co-management. – In: 
Armitage, D., Berkes, F., & Doubleday, N. (eds.). 
Adaptive Co-management. Collaboration, Learning and 
Multi-Level Governance. University of British Colom-
bia Press, Vancouver, British Colombia, Canada, pp. 
1-19.
Berkes, F. 1994. Co-management: Bridging the two Soli-
tudes. – Northern Perspectives 22 (2-3): 18-20.
Berkes, F. 1995. Community-Based Management of 
Common Property Resources. – Encyclopedia of Envi-
ronmental Biology 1: 371-373.
Berkes, F. 1997. New and not so new directions. Co-
management. – The common property Resource Digest 
(42): 5-7.   
Berkes, F., George, P., & Preston, J.P. 1991. Co-man-
agement. The Evolution in Theory and Practice of the 
Joint Administration of Living resources. – Alternatives 
18 (2): 12-18. 
Berg, B.A. 1994. Reindriftsloven av 1933. Om den første 
reindriftsloven som omfattet hele Norge: Bakgrunn, 
forhistorie og innhold. (The Reindeer Husbandry Law 
of 1933). – Diedut Vol. 4  Kautokeino. 142pp. 
Biddle, B.J. 1986. Recent Developments in Role Theory. 
– Annual Review of Sociology, 12: 67-92.  
Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Pimbert, M., Farvar, M.T., Ko-
thari, A., & Renard, Y. 2007. Sharing Power. A global 
guide to collaborative management of natural resources. 
Earthscan, UK, Oxford. XXXVII+473pp.
Bull, K.S. 1995. En kritisk analyse av reindriftsloven (A 
critical analysis of the reindeer husbandry law). – Lov 
og rett. Norsk juridisk tidsskrift 11: 396-413. 
Bull, K.S. 1997. Studier i reindriftsrett (Studies in rein-
deer husbandry law). Tano Aschehoug, Oslo. 149pp.
Bull, K.S. 2001. Rettshistorie 1852-1960 (Legal history 
1852-1960). – In: Bull, K.S., Oskal, N., & Sara, M.N. 
2001. Reindriften i Finnmark. Rettshistorie. 1852-1960. 
Cappelen Akademiske Forlag, Oslo. 376pp.
Rangifer, 31 (1), 2011180
Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P.G., & Røvik, 
K.A. 2004. Organisasjonsteori for offentlig sektor. In-
strument, kultur, myter (Organization theory for pu-
blic sector). Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 212pp. 
Connelly, S. 2011. Constructing Legitimacy in the New 
Community Governance. – Urban Studies 48 (5): 929-
946. 
Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and its critics.  Yale University 
Press, New Haven. VIII+397pp. 
Dolšak, N. & Ostrom, E. 2003. The Challenges of the 
Commons. –  In: Dolšak, N. & Ostrom, E. (eds.). The 
Commons in the New Millennium. Challenges and Ad-
aptation. The MIT press, London, pp. 3-34
Gaventa, J. 2004. Representation, community leadership 
and participation: citizens involvement in neighborhood 
renewal and local governance. Neighborhood Renewal 
Unit Office of Deputy Prime Minister. London. 34pp.
Häikiö, L. 2007. Expertise, Representation and the 
Common Good: Grounds for Legitimacy in the Ur-
ban Governance Network. – Urban Studies 44 (11): 
2147-2162. 
Hausner, V.H., Fauchald, P. Jernsletten, J.L. Tveraa, 
T., Pedersen, E., Ulvevadet, B., Yoccoz, N.G. & Ims, 
R.A. 2011. The Ghost of the Development Past. The 
Impact of Economic Security Policies on Saami Pas-
toral Ecosystems. – Ecology and Society 16 (3) Art 4. 
(Online) URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol16/iss3/art4/
Hanna, S.H. 1998. Institutions for marine ecosystems: 
economic incentives and fishery management. – Eco-
logical applications 8 (1): S170-S174.
Jacobsen, D.I. 2007. Politikk og administrasjon på lokalt 
nivå – den lokal administrasjons politiske makt. En studie 
av lokalpolitikere og kommunale administrative ledere i 
30 Sørlandskommuner (Politics and administration at lo-
kal level – the political power of the local level administra-
tions). Dissertation submitted for the degree of D. Phil. 
University of Tromsø, Samfunnsvitenskapelig fakultet, 
Institutt for Statsvitenskap, vi+363pp. 
Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries co-management. Delegating 
government responsibility to fishermen’s organization. 
– Marine Policy 13 (2): 137-154.
Jentoft, S. 1998. Allmenningens komedie. Medforvaltning 
i fiskeri og reindrift (The comedy of the commons. Co-
management in fisheries and reindeer husbandry). Ad 
Notam Gyldendal, Oslo. 212pp.
Jentoft, S. 2000. Legitimacy and disappointment in fish-
eries management. Prospects of user-participation. – 
Marine Policy 24 (2): 141-148. 
Jentoft, S. 2003. Introduction. Co-management – the 
way forward. – In: Wilson, D.C., Raakjaer Nielsen, 
J., & Degnbol, P. (eds.). The Fisheries Co-management 
Experience. Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects. – 
Fish and Fisheries series Vol. 26, pp. 1-14.
Jentoft, S. & McCay, B., 1995. User participation in 
fisheries management. Lessons drawn from interna-
tional experiences. – Marine Policy 19 (3): 227-246.
Jentoft, S., McCay, B., & Wilson, D.C. 1998. Social 
Theory and Fisheries management. –Marine Policy 22 
(4-5): 423-436. 
Jentoft, S., Mikalsen, K.H., & Hernes, H.K. 2003. Rep-
resentation in fisheries co-management. – In: Wilson, 
D. Clyde, Raakjaer Nielsen, J. & Degnbol, P. (eds.). 
The Fisheries Co-management Experience. Accomplish-
ments, Challenges and Prospects. Fish and Fisheries series. 
Vol. 26, pp. 281-292
Kalstad, J.K.H. 1998. Pastoralism and Management 
of Common Land in Sami Districts. – In: Jentoft, S. 
(ed.). Commons in a Cold Climate. Coastal Fisheries and 
Reindeer Pastoralism in North Norway: The co-manage-
ment Approach. Man and the Biosphere series, Vol. 22, 
pp. 235-247. 
Kalstad, J.K.H. 1999. Reindriftspolitikk og samisk kul-
tur. En uløselig konflikt? En studie av reindriftstilpas-
ninger og moderne reindriftspolitikk (Reindeer hus-
bandry politics and Sami culture. A conflict without 
resolution? A study of adaptations in and the contem-
porary politics of reindeer husbandry). – Diedut nr. 2, 
Nordisk Samisk Institutt, Kautokeino. 329pp.
Karlstad, S. 1998. Institutional theory, co-management 
and sustainable development in Saami reindeer pasture 
commons – critical factors for a robust system of local 
management. - In: Jentoft, S. (ed.). Commons in a Cold 
Climate. Coastal Fisheries and Reindeer Pastoralism in 
North Norway: The co-management Approach. Man and 
the Biosphere series, Vol. 22, pp.247-267. 
Lemos, M.C., & Agrawal, A. 2006. Environmental gov-
ernance.  – Annual Review of Environment and Resourc-
es 31: 297-325.
Lie, I., Riseth, J.Å., & Holst, B. 2008. Reindrift i et skif-
tende klimabilde. Historiske erfaringer og tilpasnin-
ger, og framtidige konsekvenser av klimaendringer for 
reindrift i Norge (Reindeer husbandry in a changing 
climate). – Norut Alta rapport nr. 6. Norut Alta, Alta. 
Xix+99pp. 
Lowndes, V. 1995. Citizenship and Urban Politics. – In: 
Judge, D., Stoker, G. & Wolman, H. (eds.). Theories 
of Urban Politics. Sage Publications, London, pp. 160 
-180.
March, J.G & Olsen, J.P. 2006. Elaborating the “New 
Institutionalism”. – In: Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S & 
Rockman, B. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Institutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3-20.
Manin, B., Przeworski, A., & Stokes, S.C. 1999. Intro-
duction. – In: Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. C. & Manin, 
B. (eds.). Democracy, Accountability and Representa-
tion. Cambridge University Press. UK, Cambridge. 
IX+350pp.
Rangifer, 31 (1), 2011 181
McCay, B.J. 1996. Common and Private Concerns. – In: 
Hanna, S., Folke, C., & Mäler, K. G. (eds.). Rights to 
Nature. Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and Political 
Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Island 
Press, Washington, pp. 111-126.
Mikalsen, K.M. & Jentoft, S. 2001. From User-groups 
to Stakeholders? The Public Interests in Fisheries and 
Coastal Management. – Marine Policy 25 (4): 281-292. 
Mitchell, T. 1997. Representation in Government 
Boards and Commissions. – Public Administration Re-
view 57 (2): 160-167.
Myrnes, C.E. 2010. ”Vi møtes på halvveien?”. En studie 
av relasjoner mellom den fastboende befolkningen og rein-
driftssamer i et sørsamisk område. (”We meet half way?” 
A study about the relations between the local population 
and the reindeer pastoralists in a south Sami area. – Mas-
teroppgave i sosialantropologi (Thesis for the masters 
degree in social anthropology). Fakultet for humanio-
ra, samfunnsvitenskap og lærerutdanning. Universite-
tet i Tromsø, våren 2010.  X+108pp. 
Nielsen, J.R. 2003. An analytical framework for study-
ing: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries manage-
ment. – Marine Policy 27 (5): 425-432.  
Olsen, J.P. 2004. Survey article: Unity, diversity and 
democratic institutions. Lessons from the European 
Union.  – Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (4): 461-
495. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolu-
tion of Institutions for Collective Actions. Cambridge 
University Press. UK, Cambridge. XIII+271pp. 
Ostrom, E. & Schlager, E. 1996. The Formation of Prop-
erty Rights. – In: Hanna, S., Folke, C. & Mäler, K. G 
(eds.). Rights to Nature. Ecological, Economic, Cultural, 
and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environ-
ment. Island Press, Washington. 127-156pp.
Palmer, D., Friedland, R., & Singh, J.V. 1986. The Ties 
that Bind: Organizational and class Bases of Stability in 
a Corporate Interlock Network. – American Sociologi-
cal Review 51 (6): 781-796. 
Pinkerton, E. 1989. Attaining Better Fisheries Manage-
ment through Co-management - Prospects, Problems 
and Propositions. – In: Pinkerton, E. (ed.). Cooperative 
Management of Local Fisheries. New Directions for im-
proved Management & Community Development. The 
University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, Brit-
ish Colombia, Canada. pp. 3-33. 
Plotke, D. 1997. Representation is democracy. – Constel-
lations 4 (1): 19-34. 
Pomeroy, R.S. & Berkes, F. 1997. Two to tango: the role 
of government in fisheries co-management. – Marine 
Policy 21 (5): 465-480. 
Prestbakmo, H. & Ravna, Ø. 2009. Utfordringer for 
jordskifterettene i de samiske områdene (Challenges 
for the Land Consolidation Court in the sami areas). 
– In: Ravna, Ø. (ed.). Perspektiver på jordskifte (Perspec-
tives on land consolidation). Gyldendal Norske Forlag 
AS, Oslo. 215-233pp. 
Prezworski, A. 2003. States and Markets. A Primer in 
Political Economy. Cambridge University Press, USA. 
X+223pp. 
Purdue, D. 2001. Neighborhood Governance: Leader-
ship, Trust and Social Capital. – Urban Studies 38 (12): 
2211-2224.
Paine, R. 1994. Herds of the tundra. A portrait of Sami 
reindeer pastoralism. Smithsonian Institution Press, 
Washington and London. XI+342pp.
Riseth, J.Å. 2000. Sami reindeer management under 
technological change 1960-1990. Implications for com-
mon-pool resource use under various natural and insti-
tutional conditions. A comparative analysis of regional de-
velopment paths in West Finnmark, North Trøndelag and 
South Trøndelag/ Hedmark. – Doctor Scientarium the-
sis. 2000:1. Department of Economics and Social Sci-
ences. Agricultural University of Norway. XVI+239pp. 
Riseth, J.Å. & Vatn, A. 2009. Modernization and Pasture 
Degradation: A comparative Study of Two Sami Rein-
deer Pasture Regions in Norway. – Land Economics 5 
(1): 87-106.
Sandström, A. & Rova, C. 2010. Adaptive co-man-
agement Networks: a Comparative Analysis of Two 
Fishery Conservation Areas in Sweden. – Ecology and 
Society 15 (3) Art 14. (Online) URL: http://www.eco-
logyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art14/
Sara, M.N. 1993. Reindriftens tilpasning og nærings-
politikk (The adaptation of reindeer husbandry and 
industry politics). – Diedut nr. 2. Nordisk Samisk In-
stitutt, Kautokeino. 192pp.
Searing, D.D. 1991. Roles, Rules and Rationality in the 
New Institutionalism. – The American Political Science 
Review 85 (4): 1239-1260. 
Singelton, S. 2000. Co-operation or Capture? The para-
dox of co-management and community participation 
in natural resource management and environmental 
policy-making.  –Environmental Politics 9 (2): 1-21. 
Scott, W.R. 2003. Organizations: Rational, Natural and 
Open Systems. Prentice-Hall. 5. edition, USA, New Jer-
sey. XV+430pp.
Solem, E. 1970. Lappiske rettsstudier (Legal studies of 
Sami institutions). Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 342pp. 
Taylor, M. 2003. Public Policy in the Community: Public 
Policy and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, UK, Basing-
stoke. XVI+263pp. 
Tømmervik, H., Johansen, B., Riseth, J.Å., Karlsen, 
S.R., Solberg, B. & Høgda, K.A. 2009. Above ground 
biomass changes in the mountain birch forests and 
mountain heaths of Finnmarksvidda, northern Nor-
way, in the period 1957-2006. – Forest Ecology and 
Management 257 (1): 244-257. 
Rangifer, 31 (1), 2011182
Ulvevadet, B. 2000. Penger teller, kultur avgjør. Analyse 
av statens virkemiddelbruk for å oppnå en bærekraftig 
reindrift i Vest-Finnmark, og reindriftssamenes reaksjo-
ner på denne politikk (Money counts, culture decides. An 
analysis of governmental measures to reach a sustainable 
reindeer industry in West Finnmark, and the Sami pasto-
ralists’ reactions to this policy). Hovedoppgave i sosiologi 
(Master thesis in sociology). Institutt for sosiologi og 
samfunnsgeografi, Universitetet i Oslo. 117pp. 
Ulvevadet, B. 2001. Hva er bærekraftig utvikling i Finn-
mark? Om begrepet bærekraft og problemene med å 
implementere dette i en nomadisk næring. (What is 
sustainable development in Finnmark? About the term 
sustainability and the problems of implementing this 
in a nomadic industry). – In: Kalland, A. & Rønnow, 
T. (eds.). Miljøkonflikter. Om bruk og vern av naturres-
surser (Environmental conflicts. About use and protection 
of natural resources). Unipub forlag, Oslo. 98-115pp. 
Ulvevadet, B. 2004. Norway. – In: Ulvevadet, B. & Klo-
kov, K. (eds). Family-based Reindeer Herding and Hunt-
ing Economies, and the Status and Management of Wild 
Reindeer/Caribou Populations. Arctic Council 2002-
2004. Centre for Sami studies, University of Tromsø. 
117pp.
Ulvevadet, B. 2008. Management of reindeer husbandry 
in Norway - power-sharing and participation. – Rangi-
fer 28 (1): 53-78.
Ulvevadet, B. & Hausner, V.H. 2011. Incentives and 
regulations to reconcile conservation and develop-
ment: Thirty years of governance of the Sami pastoral 
ecosystem in Finnmark, Norway. – Journal of Environ-
mental Management 92 (10): 2794-2802. 
Wilson, D.C. 2003. The community development tradi-
tion and fisheries co-management. –  In: Wilson, D. 
Clyde, Raakjaer Nielsen, J. & Degnbol, P. (eds.). The 
Fisheries Co-management Experience. Accomplishments, 
Challenges and Prospects. Fish and Fisheries series. Vol. 
26, pp. 17-29.
Young, O.R. 2002. The Institutional Dimension of Envi-
ronmental Change. Fit, Interplay, and Scale. The MIT 
Press. UK, Cambridge. 289pp. 
Zachrisson, A. 2004. Co-management of Natural Re-
sources. Paradigm Shifts, Key Concepts and Cases. 
Mountain Mistra Programme report no. 1. Umeå. 30pp.
Manuscript received   4 April, 2011
revisions accepted 8. November, 2011
Problemer og utfordringer for brukerdeltakelse: Representasjonssystemet i reindriftsnæringen i Norge
Abstract in Norwegian / Sammendrag: I denne artikkelen, som er basert på en kvalitativ studie fra forvaltningen av rein-
driften i Norge, hevder jeg at inkludering av ressursbrukerne i medforvaltningsprosessen kan i noen tilfeller i strid 
med antakelsen om effekten av medforvaltning, øke sosiale spenninger og svekke oppslutningen om styringssystemet i 
ressursforvaltningen. I reindriften utgjør medforvaltningssystemet fire nivåer; de to øverste nivåene består av styremed-
lemmer (både reineiere og andre) som er politisk valgt og dermed tar politiske beslutninger. De to lavere nivåene, på det 
lokale plan, har kun reineiere som styremedlemmer. Denne artikkelen fokuserer på det regionale medforvaltningsniv-
ået: de regionale områdestyrene. Erfaringer fra medforvaltning i reindriften i Norge viser at systemet fungerer relativt 
bra i de fleste områdene, men på grunn av de ulike forholdene mellom områdene oppstår det et legitimitetsproblem 
i tilknytning til hvordan representantene er oppnevnt og hvordan de ulike interessene er fordelt i styrene. Jeg hevder 
derfor at selv om politikken og institusjoner er tilpasset de lokale forholdene, så kan det være nødvendig med en sterkere 
kobling mellom styrene og andre institusjoner, som for eksempel Sametinget og Reindriftsforvaltningen sentralt. Mer 
konkret, hevder jeg at i stedet for å styrke legitimiteten gjennom å forsøke på å oppnå lik representasjon av brukere på 
arenaer der forvaltningsavgjørelser bli tatt, fører selve strukturene i systemet – spesielt nominasjon og oppnevning – til 
ulik brukerrepresentasjon og dermed til at forvaltningssystemet ikke fungerer etter intensjonen. 
